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Reconciling Divergent Rights : New
York 's Proposed Police and Public Protection Act
Christoph er J. Morse
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
fn the United States the cons t itutional rights of individuals are set forth in the Co nstit u tion of the United States
and in the constitutions
of the states . The United States
Constitution
is the basic law of the land and creating th e
minimum protections
afforded individuals . Each state is
free to enact its own law as long as it does not diminish
the rights of individuals
under the federal
constitution.
The legislative
bodies of the United States and each individual state have enacted statutes
that constitute
the
criminal procedure
law of that jurisdiction
. Thes e statutory schemes are similar since the y are based upon the
same constitutional
principles . This article examines th e
model Police and Public Protection
Act of New York , designed to amend and expand state criminal procedure
law
The act has b ee n introduced
by New York's Governor
George Pataki. and uses New York Stat e Criminal Procedure Law , although
it would serve as a model for most
states.

I NTROD UCTIO N

lthough the sea rch an d seiz ure provisions of the United
States Cons titution (U.S . Const. Amend. IV) and the
New York State Constitution (N.Y. Const. Art. I, Sec.
12) are virtua lly identi cal, the Co urt of Appeals (New York 's
highest court) has inte rprete d the state constitution's provisions
more broadly than its federa l coun terpart. In New York, a typical
"Terry" stop and frisk (Terry v. Ohio 1968), which the U.S. Su-
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preme Court has held meets the federal constitutional standard, is
treated with greater scrutiny by New York's high court. The state
court, relying on state constitutional law, has enunciated a definition of "reasonableness" (the touchstone of all search and seizure analysis) that, in effect, makes some searches and seizures
that would not violate the federal constitution unreasonable as a
1
matter of state law. Consequently, evidence has been suppressed
in New York state courts that would be constitutionally admissible in federal court.
The phenomenon of divergent constitutional jurisprudence
based on state constitutional grounds has increased in recent
years,2 especially after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Michigan v. Long ( 1983) which clearly articulated the standard
for determining whether a state court decision rested on an adequate and independent ground.
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed this
approach: "We believe that Michigan v. Long properly serves its
purpose and should not be disturbed. Under it, state courts are
absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution" (Arizona v. Evans 1995).
Diversity of constitutional protections between the federal
and state laws is not without problems , however. New York's
governor, George Pataki , has bitterly complained about the Court
of Appeals, beginning in a 1996 press conference: "In New York
State , a body of court interpretations has arisen that handcuffs
our police officers, that limits our prosecutors' ability to enforce
the law adequately and makes it too often impossible to have a
'Compare People v. De8011r (l 976) with Terry v. Ohio (I 968), discussed below.
The Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court has written an excellent introduction to
this emerging trend. Randall T. Shepard. TTieNew Judicial Federalism: A New Generation : The Mat11ring Na111reof State Constillltion J11rispmdence, 30 Val. U.L. Rev. 42 l
2

(1996).
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3

fair trial. It has got to change ." Pataki introduced in the New
4
York State Assembly, the Police and Public Protection Act in an
effort to bring the state 's standard in line with the looser federal
standard of reasonableness. The bill would amend the state 's
criminal procedure statutory law in a way that effectively adopts
several standards from the U.S. Supreme Court 's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to the exclusion of standards that the
New York Court of Appeals has held are embodied in the state
constitution.
Some critics contend that the governor 's proposal represents
an all-out assault on the Fourth Amendment, and more particu5
larly, the exclusionary rule. The proponents of the bill , on the
contrary, contend that the proposed bill seeks a return to federally recognized standards that guarantee the rights of the accused
and incorporate a reasonableness standard that protects law enforcement officers as well as the public at large.
This paper examines and explains the Governor 's proposal ,
concluding that it is both prudent and constitutional. The second
and third sections of the paper examine the federal constitutional
standard and the origins and development of the state constitu tion 's search and seizure provisions , respectively . The next section introduces and discusses the proposed legislation. Finall y,
the conclu sion offer s some thou ghts on rea sonablenes s and effective law enforcement.

3
Clifford J. Levy, " Pataki is See kin g Curbing of Rights of Crime Suspec ts," N. Y Times,
Jan. JO. 1996, p. A 1 (her einafter Crime S11
spec1s).
'S . Bill 6 154. intr od uced Octobe r I J. 1999, by Senato r Vo lker . The bil l was origi nally
propose d in Gove rnor Patak i 's State of the State addr ess in 1996. See Crime Suspec ts,
foomote J.
5
For exampl e, Norm an Sieg al, Executive Directo r of the New York Civi l Libertie s Union,
ca lled the pro posal "ar, attempt to demonize and unde rm ine the independenc e of the
Co urt of Appeals ." and suspects that Patak i is try ing "to chill (the Co urt of Appeals] for
future inte rpretati ons ." Crime Suspects. footno te J. p. A I.
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THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION'S
REASONABLENESS STANDARD

The U .S. Supreme Court predicates the reasonableness of a
6
search and seizure on the Fourth Amendment. In the context of
what is "reasonable" for a protective search by law enforcement
officers , the Court defined the constitutional dimensions of "reasonableness " in Terry v. Ohio (1968) .
In Terry, two defendants were observed behaving suspiciously by a police officer : they walked up and down the block ,
looked into a store window, and returned to their original position on the come!,"to confer. The officer noted that the duo repeated this ritual five or six times. When a third man appeared
and proceeded to converse with the duo, the police officer suspected they were "casing a job. " The officer decided to investigate ; he approached the trio to inquire about their actions. One of
the suspects mumbled something incoherent in response to the
officer 's inquiry , at which point the officer spun the defendant
around and patted down the outside of his clothing. The officer
felt a pistol in the defendant 's overcoat , but he was initially unable to remove it. Finall y, when the defendant was asked to remove his overcoat , the officer retrieved a .38 caliber revolver ; a
"pat down " of the other defendant yielded a second concealed
weapon .
The defense motion to suppress the evidence on the ground
that the search violated the Fourth Amendment was rejected at
trial and the defendant s were convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Court , the conv iction was affirmed. The majority of the
Court held that it would be unreasonable to deny the officer the
power necessary to determine whether the person under suspi-

•seeElkins v. United States ( 1960): "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and
seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures."
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cion is carrying a weapon. The Court proceeded to promulgate a
reasonableness standard that protects law enforcement officers
and the public at large-a standard that embodies the protections
under the Fourth Amendment. ;
The admissibility of the fruits of an illegal search and seizure,
more commonly known as the exclusionary rule , was established
7
in Weeks v. United (1914) , where the Supreme Court held that
any evidence retrieved by means of an illegal search and seizure
would be inadmissible in court . The Court 's decision was instrumental in setting out the criteria to which federal law enforcement officials would adhere when effecting a search and
seizure . Moreover , the resultant reaction to the exclusionary rule
was the catalyst for the 1938 New York constitutional conven tion. Article I Sec . 12 of the state constitution enumerates the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures , and is now the
point of contention of judicial interpretation in modem day
8
search and seizure adjudication in New York State .
With the expanded application of the exclusionary rule came
maj or developments in search and seizure law. The Warren
Court , which tightened criminal procedural requiremen ts for the
federal and state governments, imposed more stringent Fourth
Amendment standards and greatly curtailed exceptions to war9
rantles s searches.
More recentl y, however. the exclusionary rule has itself been
scaled back. The Burger Court declined to expand application of
the rule and refu sed to apply it to grand jury proceedin gs, un-

1°

' The defendant was charged w ith us ing the ma ds to promo te illegal gambli ng, and the
evidence include d le tte rs seize d fro m his ho me dun ng a wa rrant less sea rch . The Supreme
Cou rt suppr esse d the lette rs .
8
Before the 1938 consti tu tional conve nt io n . Ne w Yo rk was one of the few sta tes w ithout
a s tate co nstnu tional co unte rp an to the fede ral co nstiruu on 's fou rth am end men t.
9
See . e .g., Warden v . Hay.fe n ( 1967 ). de lineatin g a narrow e xce pt ion for ' ho t pur suit.'
10
See United States v. Calandra (197 -l).
·
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less the evidence was obtained in violation of the federal wire11
tapping statute , to cases where the Fourth Amendment infrac12
tion violated the rights of persons other than the accused, or to
cases where the police had a good-faith belief that their conduct
. . l. 13
was constitut10na
Not only did the Burger Court refuse to expand the scope of
the exclusionary rule, but also the justices (several of whom had
questioned its underlying doctrine) began to gradually carve
away at it. In California v. Minjares (1979), Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, explicitly called for the "wholesale reexamination" of the rule, and strongly suggested that its
contemporary underpinnings were theoretically weak. Justice
White, dissenting in Stone v. Powell ( 1976), explicitly endorsed
modifying the exclusionary rule "so as to prevent its application
in those may circumstances where the evidence at issue was
seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds
for this belief." Justice Powell, in Schneckloth v. Bustamante
(1973) advised against extending the rule to federal habeas corpus proceedings. In Brewer v. Williams (1977), Justice Powell
went even further when he suggested that the rule should not be
triggered by technical or inadvertent Fourth Amendment violations. Chief Justice Burger, concurring with the dissent in Stone,
explicitly called for modifying the scope of the exclusionary
rule. Finally , Justice Blackrnun, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire
(1971 ), advanced the view that the exclusionary rule was not a
Fourth Amendment edict.

''See UniredSrnresv. Ge11hnrd( 1972).
12
See Rnkos v . Illinois ( 1978). In order for a defendant to claim Fou11hAmendment protection, he must show that ht: has standing by demonstrating that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place or item seized.
13
St;e U11ired
Stntes v. Leo11( 1984).
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With the Justices questioning the soundness of the exclusionary rule, it was inevitable that an exception to it would be established. A good-faith exception to the rule was announced in
United States v. Leon (1984) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard
( 1984). In those cases, the Court held that the exclusionary rule
could not be used to bar evidence gathered by officers acting in
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. The Court reasoned that because the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police misconduct, it
need not apply to judicial officers issuing warrants. As the Court
explained in Leon, "the Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purpose makes clear that the use of fruits of past unlawful search
and seizure works no new 'Fourth Amendment wrong."' The
Court went further by describing the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created remecy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." The goodfaith exception was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. Evans O995), where an officer made an arrest pursuant that
was erroneously entered by a court clerk on the police computer.
''[B]ecause court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement
team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime ... they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion of evidence could not be
expected to deter such individuals from failing to inform police
officials that a warrant had been quashed." Furthermore "[I]f
court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer
record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently
deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction [as the
exclusion of said evidence)." The court held that the suppression
VOL. 29 200 l
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of evidence because of clerical error on the part of those with no
interest in the outcome of a police investigation undermines law
enforcement.
At the same time that New York criminal procedure laws
were more restrictive, the Supreme Court continued to expand
the authority of the federal agents in order to ensure the public
safety of society. This expansion included the automatic right of
police officers with probable cause to inspect belongings found
14
in a car that is capable of concealing the object of the search.
Moreover, in Minnesota v. Carter (19xx), the Court revisited the
issue of standing and held that a guest in the home of another
15
could not object to the warrantless search of the home. The
most interesting facet of this case is the method in which the law
enforcement officers had obtained information about the defendants illegal drug trafficking: The officers were looking in an
apartment window through the gaps in a closed Venetian blind.
The Court chose to decide this case on standing, but it not clear
how the Court would have decided if defendant otherwise did
16
have standing. Based upon the court's earlier ruling in Katz v.
United States ( 1967), the court would probably have upheld the
search on the ground that anyone walking by could have observed the activities through the gaps in the blinds. Moreover,
because of the commercial nature of the activity involved, the
expectation of privacy was "different from, and less than, a
similar expectation in a home" (New York v. Burger 1987).

14

See Wyoming v. Ho11gluo11( 1999).
The defendant was bagging cocaine in his confederate's apartment and evidence indicated that the apartment was be,ng used for business purposes as opposed to a "home ."
As a general proposition of standing. the Court determined that legitimate overnight
guests in another ' s premises do have standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy .
16
Justice Rehnquist speaking for the majority had observed "because we conclude that
respondenlS had no legitimate expectauon of privacy in the apartment. we need not decide whether the police oflicer's observauons consututed a 'search.'"
15
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NEW YORK STATE'S L AW

Origin of the State 's Search and Seizure Prohibition
In New York State, Judge Car dozo of the Court of Appeal s
was high ly critic al of the Supreme Court's ruling in Weeks and
the exc lusion rule it recognized:
We must determine whether evidence of criminality,
proc ured by an act of trespass, is to be rejected as incompetent for the misconduct of the trespasser. [T]he
criminal is to go free because the constable blun dered .... [I]n this State the immunity is the creature,
not of the constitution, but of statute . .... The Legislature, which created it, has acquiesced in the ruling
of this court that prohibitio n of the search did not
anathe matize the evidence yielded through the
search. If we had misread the statute or misconceived
the public policy, a few words of amendment would
have quickly set us right. The process of amendment
is prompt and simple . [A] room is searched against
the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If
the place of discovery may not be proved, the other
circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant with the crime . The privacy of the home has
been infringed and the murderer goes free. [W]e may
not subject society to these dangers until the Legislature has spoken with a clea rer voice. [T]he question
is whether protection for the individual would not be
gained at a disproportional loss of protection for society . One the one side is the social need that crime
shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that
laws not be flouted by the insolence of office. There
are dar.gers in any choice . The rule of the Adams case
strikes a balance between opposing interests. We
must hold it to be law until those organs of governments by which a change of public polic y is normally
effected. shall give notice to the courts that the
change has come to pass (Peopl e v. DeFor e 1926).
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In People v. DeFore (1926) , the arresting officer entered the
defendant 's room and searched it after the defendant was in custody. The search yielded a bag containing a blackjack. Although
the defendant was acquitted of larceny (the basis for the arrest in
the first instance), he was subsequently indicted and convicted of
illegal weapons possession based on the blackjack discovered in
the post-arrest warrantless search. On appeal, the conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In a scathing opinion, Judge
Cardozo declared that it would be a mistake to allow "the criminal [to go] free because the constable has blundered" and public
welfare and safety concerns must override the illegality of the
search. In essence, Cardozo stated that the evidence would not be
suppressed unless the state legislature overrides the Court of Appeal 's decision by constitutional amendment. In sum , he suggested that the lawmakers "fix" the problem by amending the
New York State Constitution.
Cardozo's call for a state constitution convention, however,
did not anticipate that the federal constitutional search and seizure prohibitions would become binding on the states in Wolf v.
Colorado (1949). ii The issues addressed by the Court of Appeals
in DeFore were pivotal in the arguments made by Thomas
Dewey and others at the New York constitutional convention.
The debate in New York over search and seizure provisions
began at the 1938 convention. Thomas E. Dewey, a Republican
and a one-time federal and special state prosecutor was elected
as District Attorney of New York County (Pitier 1996). Dewey
was also a staunch opponent of an exclusionary rule and proposed judicial supervision of wiretapping.
The primary proponent of the new constitutional provisions
was State Senator and Democratic majority leader John Dunnigan. Dunnigan 's liberal proposal was three-tiered: first, it would
replicate the language of the Fourth Amendment; second , it
THE JOURNAL OF POLITI CAL SCIENCE
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brought the interception of telephone, telegraph, and other communications within the scope of New York's Constitution; third,
it required the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
these prohibitions.
In the end, the convention was able to agree on a compromise
that became Article I Sec. 12 of the New York constitution. The
language is identical to the federal constitution's search and seizure provision (U.S. Const. Amend. IV), with the addition of an
extra paragraph addressing wiretapping. The exclusionary rule
itself was not explicitly inserted into the text.

New York State's Standard
Because of the provisions of the New York State Constitution, the Court of Appeals expanded its interpretation of what a
"protective search" and "reasonableness" entail. New York law
departs from the Terry doctrine, and has its own guidelines for
reasonableness in prot~ctive searches, first articulated in People
v. DeBour (1976).
In DeBow; two police officers were on patrol around midnight on a street illuminated by ordinary street lamps, devoid of
pedestrian traffic. They noticed a solitary figure (the defendant
DeBour) across the street. When the officers stopped to inquire
what he was doing in the neighborhood, the defendant nervously
responded that he had "just parked his car and was on his way to
visit a friend.'' When asked for identification. he said that he did
not have any. Meanwhile. one of the officers noticed a slight
waist-high bulge in his jacket. The officer asked the defendant to
unzip his jacket; in so doing, the defendant revealed a revolver
protruding from his waistband. The gun was removed, and DeBour was arrested for illegal possession of a weapon. The officer's testimony conflicted with the defendant's, and the trial
court denied the defense motion to suppress, crediting the offi-
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cer's testimony. The a~~ellate division affirmed conviction
(People v. DeBour 1975).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, DeBour was heard along
with a similarly situated case, People v. La Pene (1976). The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in DeBour, but reversed the conviction in La Pene. The opinion of the court set
the stage for the interpretation of the New York State Constitution and marked the beginning of a new standard for protective
searches (Pitier 1996).
Judge Wachtler proceeded to enunciate a "reasonableness"
standard-a four-tier system called the "sliding scale" approach
(People v. DeBour 1975). On the first level, the minimal intrusion of an officer in approaching a citizen to request information
is permissible when there is some objective credible reason for
that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality . The
next level, the common law right to inquire, requires that the inquiry must be activated by "a founded suspicion predicated on
articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot."iii Wachtler
maintained that an officer may interfere with a citizen only to
gain explanatory information, with the encounter being short of a
forcible seizure. The third degree of intrusion is the police officer's right to stop by force and detain an individual when the
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor. In New York, this level is authorized by statute (McKin18
ney 2000). The fourth and final level of intrusion is when a
police officer arrests and takes into custody a person when there
is probable cause to believe that person committed a crime in the
officer's presence. These four levels represent " ... the gradation
11

People v. De8011r,37-1 N.Y. S.2d .. NI (NY. App . Div . 2nd Dep't. I 975) .

18

This, of course.
modify .
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of permissible police authority with respect to encounters with
citizens in public places and directly correlates the degree of objectively credible belief with the permissible scope of inference."
New York's "sliding scale" approach, unlike its federal
counterpart which uses a three-tier system (Terry v. Ohio 1968),
sets a much more difficult standard for police officers. The
common law inquiry does not mandate that officers justify their
actions on the belief that "criminal activity is afoot." Rather, officers are left to their own discretion to determine if further action is necessary on the contingency that they do not go beyond
constitutional limitations. The court 's decision shifted the determination of constitutional limitations to the judgment of the police officer.
The Court of Appeals has never overruled the standard set
forth in DeBour. While many legal scholars consider the court's
standard as too burdensome, the court , itself, has said that the
standards enunciated ir, DeBour remain. In People v. Finlayson
( 1980), the court asserted that the standards enunciated in DeBour remain effective and necessary guidelines in determining
the reasonableness of police actions when no warrant exists. iv
Most recently , New York courts have sought to retain the basic standards of reasonableness in its constitutional dimensions,
and yet criticize DeBour for its rigidity. In People v. Hanson
( 1998), the defense moved to suppress on the ground that the
Terry stop violated the New York State Constitution. The motion
to suppress was denied. In an interesting interpretation of the
DeBvur standard, the court allowed that DeBour should not be
disturbed ; however. the court added that police conduct which is
"reasonable'' is not to be confined by "an inflexible legal framework" and found that DeBour is flexible enough to make determinations based on the merits of each individual case .v
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The Governor's proposal seeks to eliminate the "secondguessing" that a police officer is faced with each time he seeks to
question a citizen. Almost all other states, with the exception of
New York, follow the traditional common law rules for encounters between police and the public as endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Terry.
The proposed legislation is actually quite short: approximately a page and a half typewritten. In essence, it adds the following two substantive additio_ns to the state's criminal procedure law.
First, it states that "when engaged in law enforcement duties,
a police officer may approach a person in a public place located
within the geographical area of such officer's employment when
he has an objective, credible reason not necessarily indicative of
criminality, and to the full extent possible under the Constitution
of this state and the United States may ask such questions and
take such other actions as the officer deems appropriate."
Second, and perhaps more substantively, the bills adds the
following: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
court may not suppress evidence ... on account of a violation of
any right secured accorded by [the state constitution] unless the
court finds after a hearing that the conduct constituting the violation was committed in bad faith and not in whole or in part for
the purpose of protecting the actor or another person .... " Clearly,
the proposal effects a sea change in the Court of Appeals' jurisprudence in this area.
CONCLUSION

It is reasonable to conclude that with the Supreme Court's
unequivocal adoption of a standard that leaves state courts to
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their own devices, state judicial review in search and seizure
cases will continue to be premised on antiquated , less-thanobjective standards unless adequate legislation to the contrary is
enacted. The governor's proposal would remedy out-dated and
inconsistent common law requirements for law enforcement officials to follow. It is possible to protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of the accused while simultaneously protecting the public
and the police officers who enforce New York's laws. Police error is not tantamount to violating an accused rights because the
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and not all searches and seizures are unreasonable. 19 New
York may use its legislative powers, as enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court, to restrict within limits allowed by the U.S .
Constitution, search and seizure requirements in the state: the
criminal may not go free because the constable has blundered .
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ENDNOTES
i"[l]n order to assess the reasonableness [of an officer's] conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary to first focus upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen, for there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails." 392 U.S. at 20-21, citing Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) [internal quotation
marks omitted]. "The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can
be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances .
And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard : would the facts available to the officer warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? ... (T]he sole justification for the
search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby and
therefore, must be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer etc ....
the search in this case presents no serious problems in light of these standards." [internal
quotation marks omitted] .
ii
.
.
In Wolf, the Court concluded that the treedom from unreasonable search and seizure
was an essential element in the concept of "ordered liberry," which was applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the
Court, argued that "one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police was a fundamental Fourth Amendment guarantee." While the decision in Wolf prohibited States from
engaging in unreasonable search and seizures, it did not require application of the exclusionary rule in state prosecutions-this prohibition would be enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio
(.1_961).
111

Judge Wachtler speaking for the majority of the court stated: ''Gen erally, m the p.:rformance of their public service functions, not related to criminal law enforcement, the
police should be given wide latitude to approach individuals and request information ....
However, when police officers are engaged in their criminal law enforcement function
their ability to approach people involves other considerations and will be viewed and
measured by an entirely different standard of reasonableness .... Unfortunately, there is
scant appellate authority on this subject. even the maJority of the Supreme Court m the
Terry trilogy ( Ten)' v. Ohio 1968) ~xplicitly avoided resolving the constitutional propriety of an investigative confrontation .
ivThe court said "The Court of Appeals in DeBour identified four levels of police intrusion and the degree of knowledge and credible belief needed to Justify each. lt has now
been suggested that recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court have affected, and
perhaps undermined, some of the classifications enunciated in DeBour. Yet even if this
point of view were com.•:1-a proposition which is hardly free from doubt-the essenual
value of the DeBour holding would survive. DeBour uid not attempt to establish an in-
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flexible legal framework by which to measure police conduct. Encounters between citizens and the police in public places are of an endless variety with no two being precisely
alike ... Any attempt to catalogue them rigidly within four classifications would not only
prove virtually impossible but might well present a true danger of substituting labels for
liberties. DeBour makes no such attempt. Rather, its careful analysis provides needed and
effective guidelines for determining the reasonableness, and therefore the constitutionality, of police action in given circumstances" [internal citations and quotations omitted] .
;.,.Any legal scholar, and probably more than a few English teachers , could mount a
sizeable argument that both counsels ' amoebic arguments , of counsel themselves, not
uncommon in the criminal courts of this State under similar circumstances, are themselves toxic byproducts of DeBour and its progeny . ... There are no bright lines separating
various types of police activity . Determining whether a seizure occurs during a street
encounter between the police and a private citizen involves analysis of the most subtle
aspects of our constitutional guarantees" (citing People v . Bora 1994) [internal quotations
and citations omitted] .
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